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Figure 1: Presidents of Argentina, Brazil and Uruguay after the suspension of Paraguay in 2012. 
	 3	
Power for sale! 
 American philanthropist Walter Annenberg once said: “The greatest power is not 
money power, but political power.” This sounds like a beautiful statement about an almost 
utopian place in which money is not important, but looking at the reality, greed and wealth 
seem to shape the world. Economic power and political power are more interrelated than this 
statement suggests and the way it works together holds an important space within the debates 
on international cooperation.2 In today’s world, where countries such as India and Brazil are 
gaining more economic power and becoming increasingly important on the global level, the 
question about the impact of economic power has become especially relevant.3 To assess the 
way economic power and political power are related, this thesis will attempt to answer the 
following question: 
 
How do economic power asymmetries affect the informal influence a state can exert within 
regional economic institutions? 
 
Although every institution is designed a certain way and has procedures and rules 
about voting and policymaking, some states can exert informal influence outside of these 
formal arrangements.4 An example can be found in Randal Stone’s book on informal 
influence exerted by the United States. He looked at the loans the IMF gave in three financial 
crises and found that in each case, it was the United States that was the biggest factor in 
determining the loans, even though it holds only 17% of formal voting power.5 The 
importance of the research is therefore immediately clear: informal influence can shape policy 
in favor of the state with the most power, giving them an advantage in international 
cooperation. 
 
 The importance of this question also became clear with the emergence of economic 
regionalism, the “creation of greater economic opportunities through cooperation among 
states in the same geographical region”.6 Regional integration can serve as a way for states to 
become indispensable in today’s global world and regional leadership can help a state in 
																																																						
2 Randall Stone, Controlling Institutions (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2011), xii. 
3 Sandra Estrada, “Regional Powers and their Strategies: Empire, Hegemony, and Leadership” Review of 
International Studies 36 (2010): 903. 
4 Randall Stone, Controlling Institutions, 1. 
5 Ibid., 142 
6 Andrew Heywood, Global Politics (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2011), 482. 
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becoming an influential player on the world stage.7 An example of this can been found in 
Brazil, which was the driving force behind the creation of the Mercado Comin del Sur 
(Mercosur).8 When looking at the four countries in this trading bloc, it becomes clear that 
Brazil generates the biggest part of the economic power the institution has. In 1990, a year 
before Mercosur was founded, Brazil’s GDP was 462 billion US dollars. The three other 
states that joined Mercosur, Argentina, Uruguay and Paraguay, were clearly worse off, with 
GDPs at 141,4, 9,3 and 5,7 billion US dollars respectively.9 When looking at Mercosur, a 
hierarchical order can be seen in the economic power each state possesses, with Brazil 
towering far above the other three  
 
 To answer the research question, the relations between Mercosur member states 
Brazil, Argentina, Uruguay and Paraguay will be assessed by looking at three incidents within 
Mercosur: The Brazil-Argentina automobile sector crisis, the pulp mill conflict between 
Argentina and Uruguay and Paraguay’s suspension from the institution. By looking at these 
cases, I hope to make clear that economic power is an important factor within Mercosur, 
giving states the opportunity to manipulate processes to their own benefit. 
 
Theoretical framework 
 In the introduction, a few concepts have been brought up that I will explore. This 
section will explain the concepts of go it alone power, economic power and informal 
influence. The general argument I will attempt to make is that economic power gives states 
the opportunity to manipulate outcomes to their own benefit by exerting informal influence, 
which happens by changing the status quo and using go it alone power. 
 
Go it alone power 
 In 1648, the Peace of Westphalia created a definition of states that is still used today. 
The key element of this agreement was that all states enjoy sovereignty, meaning that they 
have control over everything that happens within their borders. International relations can 
only be carried out when this sovereignty is accepted by other states.10 But, sovereignty is a 
																																																						
7 Christian Arnold, “Empty Promises and No incorporation in Mercosur,” International Interactions (2016): 9, 
accessed March 25, 2017, DOI: 10.1080/03050629.2016.1206391. 
8 Mikael Wigzell, “Conceptualizing Regional Powers’ Geo-economics Strategies: Neo-imperialism, Neo-
mercantilism, Hegemony, and Liberal Institutionalism” Asia Europe Journal 14 (2016): 144. 
9 “Databank – World Development Indicators,” World Bank, accessed April 25, 2017, 
http://databank.worldbank.org/data/reports.aspx?source=world-development-indicators&preview=on. 
10 Andrew Heywood, Global Politics, 5. 
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contested concept and states must deal with more and more actors that challenge their 
sovereignty. Especially in the contemporary globalized world, where international 
cooperation plays an important role, states sometimes must give up some of their sovereignty 
to join international institutions.11 Within the field of international relations, different theories 
exist that give multiple reasons for states to join the international institutions. According to 
the realists, states work together to promote their own interests and to make sure their relative 
position in the world order improves, while the liberal theory believes that states work 
together towards a mutual goal where everyone is better off.12 Both theories agree that states 
join international institutions to benefit from it, whether these benefits are relative or absolute. 
 
 Lloyd Gruber is not convinced that either of these theories is correct. He asks the 
question: “Why assume that multilateral institutions always and everywhere facilitate mutual 
gains?”13 Every action taken within a nation affects people in other states as well. These 
spillover effects can be positive, but unwanted as well. When, for example, one currency 
devalues, this can create negative externalities to all its trading partners.14 According to 
Keoghan, these negative externalities would cause states to coordinate policy so they both 
benefit from policies.15 However, it is often not true that all states benefit the same amount or 
at all from international agreements, it appears the states that take the initiative for 
cooperation gain more than the states that go along.16  
																																																						
11 Margaret P. Karnes, Karen A. Mists and Kendall W. Stiles, International Organizations: The Politics and 
Processes of Global Governance (Boulder: Lynne Reiner Publishers, 2015), 76. 
12 Volker Fritterer, Bernhard Zing and Andreas Cruck, International Organization (New York: Palgrave 
Macmillan, 2012), 16, 18. 
13 Lloyd Gruber, Ruling the World: Power Politics and the Rise of Supranational Institutions (Princeton: 
Princeton University Press, 2000): 16. 
14 Ibid., 17. 
15 Ibid. 
16 Ibid., 18. 
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 In shaping international institutions and 
coordinating policy, states negotiate the options. 
The bargaining position of state is dependent on 
their potential gains and losses. If a state only has 
some potential gains and no risk of losing much, 
their bargaining position is much better, because 
they can afford to hold off on agreeing until they 
feel the agreement is good enough. But, if a state 
does have a lot of potential gains or losses, it 
cannot afford to do this because they risk losing a 
lot.17 
 
 Aside from bargaining, a state can also decide to use coercion to get another state to 
do what they want. Figure 2 shows the utility of state X and state Y and the options that lie on 
the Pareto-frontier. This frontier represents the options the two states have within their current 
status quo, in which neither party is dominant over the other. As long as the status quo stays 
in place, the frontier consists of the maximum utility each state can achieve.18 When state Y 
decides it wants to increase its utility to a point outside of the Pareto-frontier, it can choose to 
try and coerce state X to go along by, for example, threatening state X with sanctions. If state 
X does not give in to the threat, state Y will lose 
something as well. This “threat point” can be 
seen in figure 2. When state X decides to ignore 
state Y’s threat, the utility of both states will 
decrease.19 This mechanism is what makes 
coercion an undesirable method to get another 
state to do what you want, since it is not always 
credible a state will take this risk when carrying 
out their threat.20 A better way for state Y to 
improve its utility, is by coming up with 
																																																						
17 Lloyd Gruber, Ruling the World: Power Politics and the Rise of Supranational Institutions, 34. 
18 Alexander V. Lotto, V.A. Bisphenol and G.K. Kamenev, Interactive Decision Maps: Approximation and 
Visualization of Pareto Frontier (Boston: Kluwer Academic Publishers, 2004), 11. 
19 Lloyd Gruber, Ruling the World: Power Politics and the Rise of Supranational Institutions, 34. 
20 Ibid., 37. 
Figuren 2: The thread point 
Figuren 3: The new status quo 
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unilateral policies, creating a new status quo.21 Figure 3 shows the effect of the new status quo 
(SQ’): state Y’s utility has been improved, while state X’s utility has greatly decreased. After 
the creation of the new status quo, state Y can give state X the option to cooperate, which 
would lead them to state Y’s preferred comparative equilibrium, as can be seen in figure 3. 
State X can agree, but if they do not want to, state Y will be able to go it alone and still end up 
with a much higher utility than before.22 Chances are, state X will agree to state Y’s proposed 
cooperation, since their setback will be much lower than when they do not go along.23 
 
 This way of looking at international cooperation shows that it is not necessarily true 
that everyone benefits from it. Sometimes, states are pushed into joining an institution even 
though it harms them, because the costs of being left out are much higher. This gives the state 
that can change the status quo a lot of power over the ones that need to go along, creating a 
circle in which the power asymmetries are maintained. 
 
Economic power and dependency 
 “Power is like weather. Everyone depends on it and talks about it, but few understand 
it.”24 These famous words with which Joseph Nye opens his book on power show both the 
fundamental role of power and the difficulty of defining the concept. The debate on this 
concept has always been prominent in the field of globalization and cooperation. When 
observing international cooperation in international institutions, it seems that the more power 
a state possesses, the more benefits it gets out of the institution. Power is most widely 
understood as the capability of getting someone to do what you want and with that, being able 
to influence the outcomes of, for example, policy negotiations or getting states to go along 
with economic integration.25 But what exactly is the source of the power that creates these 
asymmetries? 
 
 Talking about power traditionally meant talking about military power, which was 
measured by indicators as the size of a state’s armed forces and their access to advanced 
weapons and technology. With the start of globalization, this definition of power was mostly 
																																																						
21 Lloyd Gruber, Ruling the World: Power Politics and the Rise of Supranational Institutions, 38. 
22 Ibid. 
23 Ibid., 20. 
24 Joseph Nye, Soft Power: The Means of Success in World Politics (New York: Public Affairs, 2004), 1. 
25 Andrew Heywood, Global Politics, 210. 
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left behind and economic power became more relevant.26 Since the end of the Cold War, a 
new type of warfare emerged. Instead of inter-state wars, wars are now mostly fought against 
non-state actors.27 In a world where war between major states has become unlikely, economic 
activity has probably become the most important source of power. In one of his works, 
Huntington states that “[in] the realm of economic competition, the instruments of power are 
productive efficiency, market control, trade surplus, strong currency, foreign exchange 
reserves, ownership of foreign companies, factories, and technology.”28 Another reason 
economic power is has taken a more crucial place in the world order, is the increasing amount 
of economic dependency that emerged alongside globalization. States with weaker economies 
have become more dependent on other states and international institutions.29 This closely 
relates to the concept of go it alone as described before and the potential gains and losses for 
each state. Because of this, just looking at a state’s GDP is not enough. It is important to look 
at the amount of trade between states and how much of the state’s GDP is made up of that 
trade. If, for example, the sanction state Y wants to impose on state X is to stop all trade, this 
will not make a lot of impact if that trade only accounts for an insignificant part of a state’s 
GDP. But, if this trade accounts for a big part of state X’s economy, it is dependent on it and 
will not likely risk the chance of losing it.30 
 
 Economic power and dependency are important in answering the question posed at the 
beginning of this thesis, because the poor states simply cannot afford to lose the support of the 
rich. These asymmetries therefore play a big part in shaping international institutions, but it 
does not stop there. After the institution has been formed, richer states keep on using this 
power to go around the formal rules. 
 
Informal influence 
 Every international institution has a formal design, setting out formal rules and 
procedures which member states must follow. Within these institutions, every state has a 
certain amount of control. An important factor of control lies in the voting arrangements of an 
institution.31 In some institutions, all votes have the same amount of power while in other 
																																																						
26Andrew Heywood, Global Politics, 212, 246. 
27 Ibid., 247. 
28 Samuel P. Huntington, “Why International Primacy Matters,” International Security 17, no. 4 (1993): 72-73. 
29 Andrew Heywood, Global Politics, 357. 
30 Lloyd Gruber, Ruling the World: Power Politics and the Rise of Supranational Institutions, 40. 
31 Barbara Foremen’s, Charles Lipson and Duncan Snidal, “The Rational Design of International Institutions,” 
International Organization 55, no. 1 (2001): 772. 
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institutions, votes of some member states hold more weight than others.32 Even though the 
voting arrangements in an international institution can be completely equal, giving the exact 
same amount of voting power to every state, states may have the power to exert informal 
influence, working around the formal rules to achieve their goals.33 Sometimes, states know 
that following the rules will not benefit them. If they have enough power within the 
institution, they may be able to push for an exception on those formal rules to try and achieve 
a better outcome for themselves.34 In the shaping of Mercosur, for example, Brazil wanted the 
institution to have a shared parliament, while Argentina did not. Brazil, being the most 
powerful state, got what they want.35 Another way they can use this influence, is breaking an 
agreement but refusing to have the conflict that follows handled by the institution’s dispute 
settlement system. The most powerful state will therefore get more out of the institution, 
increasing their own economic power. This causes the gap between the states to grow, 
bringing the weaker states in a vicious circle of losing control. 
 
If the use of informal influence can harm the weaker member states, why do they not 
stop it from happening? This is where the concepts described come together. Because some 
states have less economic power, they become dependent on the richer, more powerful states. 
These powerful states usually have options outside of the institution, like cooperation with 
other states of going at it alone.36 Because of the economic dependency, the richer states can 
exert informal influence, working outside the formal rules to manipulate the outcome so it 
benefits themselves the most. This influence can be used in creating policy, but also when 
breaking the rules. The weaker states will therefore receive smaller gains or maybe even lose, 
but the price of being left out is much higher.  
 
Research design 
 The distribution of power among states and the way it changes has had a prominent 
place in the field of international relations. The way this distribution of power affected the 
relations between states became especially relevant with the start of globalization, when states 
																																																						
32 Barbara Foremen’s, Charles Lipson and Duncan Snidal, “The Rational Design of International Institutions,” 
772. 
33 Randall Stone, Controlling Institutions, 3. 
34 Ibid., 33. 
35 Maria Claudia Drummond, “The Evolution of the Competence and Functions of the Joint Parliamentary 
Committee of Mercosur,” Parliaments, Estates and Representation 23, no. 1 (2003): 235. 
36 Ibid., 39. 
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started to become more interdependent.37 States long for a powerful position in the world and 
one of the things they use to try and reach that, is regional integration. Economic regionalism, 
the “creation of greater economic opportunities through cooperation among states in the same 
geographical region” 38, can help states consolidate their regional leadership, making them 
indispensable on the world stage.39 Because of this mechanism, where states use economic 
regionalism to consolidate their economic power, this thesis will focus its research around the 
distribution of economic power in regional economic institutions. 
 
 The distribution of power among states and the way it changes has had a prominent 
place in the field of international relations. The way this distribution of power affected the 
relations between states became especially relevant with the start of globalization, when states 
started to become more interdependent.40 States long for a powerful position in the world and 
one of the things they use to try and reach that, is regional integration. Economic regionalism, 
the “creation of greater economic opportunities through cooperation among states in the same 
geographical region” 41, can help states consolidate their regional leadership, making them 
indispensable on the world stage.42 Because of this mechanism, where states use economic 
regionalism to consolidate their economic power, this thesis will focus its research around the 
distribution of economic power in regional economic institutions. 
 
Methodology and case selection 
To establish a link between the concepts of economic power and informal influence, I 
will carry out a comparative case study by looking at three incidents that happened in the 
South American trading bloc Mercosur. The three cases are chosen based on a Most Similar 
Systems Design. In this type of design, cases are compared that are similar on all relevant 
independent variables, except for one. The difference in this variable will therefore most 
likely be the cause of the difference in the dependent variable.43 In the case of Mercosur, all 
states share a comparable colonial history that shaped their political and economic landscape. 
																																																						
37 Andrew Heywood, Global Politics, 5. 
38 Ibid., 482. 
39 Christian Arnold, “Empty Promises and No incorporation in Mercosur,” 9. 
40 Andrew Heywood, Global Politics (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2011), 5. 
41 Ibid., 482. 
42 Christian Arnold, “Empty Promises and No incorporation in Mercosur,” 9.  
43 Jason Sea wright and John Gering, “Case Selection Techniques in Case Study Research: A Menu of 
Qualitative and Quantitative Options,” Political Research Quarterly 61, no. 2: 304. 
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They all knew long periods of authoritarian rule and protectionism.44 The independent 
variable they do differ on, is their economic power. 
 
 The enormous differences in GDP and 
industrial capacities between the member states 
of Mercosur make them an interesting case when 
assessing the effect of economic power 
asymmetries on institutions. When looking at 
economic power, defined by the state’s GDP and 
trade-to-GDP ratio, we can see the hierarchy that 
exists among these four states. Figure 4 shows 
the GDPs of the four states from 1965 to 1991, 
the year Mercosur was founded.45 The graph immediately shows the enormous size of the 
Brazilian economy when comparing it to the rest. But, as discussed in the previous section, 
looking at the states’ GDP is not enough, we also need to look at the trade-to-GDP ratio to 
assess how economically dependent each of the states is. This ratio is shown in figure 5.46 The 
first thing that catches our eye is the line 
that represents Paraguay. It is positioned 
far above the other three, meaning that 
Paraguay is a lot more dependent on 
trade. Brazil has been the least 
dependent for most of the time, though 
they have been close to, and even above, 
Argentina from time to time.  
 
 These two figures show a clear 
difference in economic power between 
the four states. Brazil clearly is the biggest player in town; its GDP took off and left the others 
far behind and its trade-to-GDP ratio has been the lowest for most of the time, meaning that it 
																																																						
44 Thomas J. Agostino, “Latin American Politics,” in Understanding Contemporary Latin America, ed. Richard 
S. Hillman and Thomas J. Agostino (Boulder: Lynne Reiner Publishers, 2011), 69. 
45 “Databank – World Development Indicators,” World Bank, accessed April 25, 2017, 
http://databank.worldbank.org/data/reports.aspx?source=world-development-indicators&preview=on. 
46 “Trade (% of GDP),” World Bank, accessed June 9, 2017, 
http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NE.TRD.GNFS.ZS?end=2015&name_desc=false&start=2012 
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is the least dependent on the other three states. Paraguay, on the other hand, has by far the 
highest trade-to-GDP ratio, making it much more dependent on the other Mercosur member 
states. These numbers show a clear hierarchy between the four states, with Brazil on top, 
followed by Argentina and Uruguay and with Paraguay at the bottom. 
 
 To see how this economic power hierarchy translates into informal influence, three 
incidents that happened within Mercosur will be assessed. Each of these cases shows how the 
state with more economic power works outside of the formal rules to get what they want. The 
first case shows the power Brazil had over Argentina during the automobile sector crisis that 
started in 1995. Just after the signing of a treaty about tariff agreements, Brazil came up with 
a unilateral automobile regime that went against this treaty and caused great inconvenience to 
Argentina.47 The second incident shows the position of Uruguay relative to Argentina, when 
the latter put up trade blockades which violated the rules of free trade. Even though Uruguay 
filed a claim against Argentina within Mercosur and won, nothing was done to make sure 
Argentina took down their blockades.48 The last case that shows the power asymmetries 
within the institution, is the suspension of Paraguay in 2012, which was a contested decision. 
During this suspension, decisions were made without Paraguay, even though their vote would 
normally be essential. When Paraguay wanted to rejoin and they could, but only if they 
accepted all the changes that were made during their time out.49 
 
 By assessing these three cases, I hope to make clear that the differences in economic 
power cause a certain hierarchy within the institution, making sure the outcomes of most 
processes mostly favor the most powerful state involved. 
 
Mercosur 
 The object of analysis in this thesis is the South American trading block Mercosur. 
Its economic inequality makes it an interesting case, but before we can get into that, I will 
first give an overview of the history of the four states and the entire process of economic 
integration. 
																																																						
47 Laura Gómez-Mere, Power and Regionalism in Latin America: The Politics of Mercosur (Notre Dame: 
University of Notre Dame Press, 2013), 63. 
48 Inka Kaakinen and Ari Lehtinen, “A Bridge that Disconnects – On Shared and Divided Socio-Spatialities in 
the Pulp Mil Confilct between Uruguay and Argentina,” Forest Policy and Economics 70 (2016): 106. 
49 Peter Lambert, “The Myth of the Good Neighbour: Paraguay’s Uneasy Relationship with Brazil,” Bulletin of 
Latin American Research 35, no. 1 (2016): 39. 
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Historical context and economic integration 
 Mercosur was chosen to answer the research question based on a Most Similar 
Systems Design. The four countries that founded the institution are all part of the same 
geographical region, South America, but they share more than that. After Christopher 
Columbus arrived in the Caribbean, a long period of 
colonization started. The Spaniards started 
conquering a lot of land and the Portuguese started 
fearing that the Spanish empire would become too 
powerful. To resolve this problem, the Treaty of 
Tordesillas was drawn up by the pope in 1494, 
dividing the world between Spain and Portugal.50 
Figure 6 shows the division that was made and it 
shows that the land that is now Brazil was awarded 
to the Portuguese51. As can be seen on this map, the 
Portuguese only had rights over the eastern bulge of 
the South America. After the conquerors settled in 
the area, they slowly started moving to the west, 
creating what is called a “living frontier”, establishing a state that now covers almost half of 
the continent.52 Despite the difference of being colonized by Spain or Portugal, the states all 
went through a similar process of colonization, giving them a shared history of struggling 
with the formation of their governments after independence, resulting in authoritarian rule and 
protectionism.53 
 
 Economic integration in Latin America started early on, around the same time as it 
started in Europe. During the 20th century, multiple attempts of creating free trade areas in 
Latin America were made, but they all failed. The first was the Latin American Free Trade 
Agreement (LAFTA) in 1960. The goal was to create an area of free trade, but because of the 
authoritarian regimes and the protectionist ways in which most countries handled their 
																																																						
50 Lyle N. McAlister, Spain and Portugal in the New World: 1492-1700 (Minneapolis:  
University of Minnesota Press, 1984), 74. 
51 “Treaty of Tordesillas”, Encyclopeadia Brittanica, accessed on April 30, 2017, 
https://www.britannica.com/event/Treaty-of-Tordesillas. 
52 Iêda Siqueira Wiarda, “Brazil: A Unique Country,” in Latin American Politics and Development, eds. Howard 
J. Wiarda and Harvey J. Kline (Boulder: Westview Press, 2014), 100. 
53 Thomas J. D’Agostino, “Latin American Politics,” 69. 
Figure 6: The division of the world between Spain and 
Portugal because of the Treaty of Tordesillas in 1494 
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economies in that time, LAFTA failed.54 LAFTA’s successor, the Asociación 
Latinoamericana de Ingegración (Latin American Integration Association, ALADI), was 
created in 1980 with the same goal in mind. Although ALADI was more flexible than 
LAFTA, it failed because of the widespread collapse of Latin American economies in the 
beginning of the 1980s.55 
 
Things changed in the mid 1980s, when the wave of democratization that went 
through Latin America brought Brazil and Argentina together. In 1986, the two states signed 
the Programa de Integración y Cooperacón Económica Argentina-Brasil (Program for 
Integration and Economic Cooperation, PICE), which consisted of agreements on 
industrialization and trade.56 In 1988, the Treaty of Integration, Cooperation and 
Development, creating a common market, was signed by Argentina and Brazil, but it was not 
implemented until a few years later.57 In 1990, one of the biggest steps in the creation of 
Mercosur was made, with the signing of the Buenos Aires Act, which changed the approach 
to integration by setting up a judicial framework and putting a deadline for the creation of a 
free trade area: 1994.  
 
The requirement of being democratic was an important factor of integration and 
because of that, Uruguay was invited to summits from 1985 onwards and joined PICE in 1990 
while Paraguay, which did not democratize until 1989, was never part of the negotiations.58 
After the signing of the Buenos Aires Act, Uruguay made it known that they wanted to be 
included in the common market and went into negotiations with Brazil and Argentina.59 
Paraguay was excluded at first, but voiced their will to join after Uruguay became part of the 
integration process. Because it had just suffered around thirty years of dictatorship, its 
democratic institutions were weak and Paraguay was not to be found anywhere near the 
negotiations. Uruguay negotiated for them, but Paraguay ended up having to do a lot of 
concessions. But, because of its economic dependency, with these concessions they were still 
better off than they would be on their own.60 
																																																						
54 Lia Valls Pereira, “Toward the Common Market of the South,” 8. 
55 Karl Kaltenthaler and Frank O. Mora, “Explaining Latin American Economic Integration: The Case of 
Mercosur,” Review of International Political Economy 9, no. 1 (2002): 72-73. 
56 Lia Valls Pereira, “Toward the Common Market of the South,” 9. 
57 Gian L. Gardini, “Who Invented Mercosur?” Diplomacy and Statecraft 18, no. 4 (2007): 806. 
58 Ibid., 818. 
59 Ibid., 819. 
60 Karl Kaltenthaler and Frank O. Mora, “Explaining Latin American Economic Integration: The Case of 
Mercosur,” 88. 
		
15	
In 1991, the moment finally arrived: the presidents of Brazil, Argentina, Uruguay and 
Paraguay signed the Treaty of Asunción and Mercosur was founded. According to this treaty, 
a common market had to be in place by December 1994. Trade liberalization, common 
external tariff, coordination of macroeconomic policy and sectoral agreements were included 
in the treaties as means to reaching the goal of the common market.61 The transition period 
between 1991 and 1994 consisted of a lot of negotiations and was wrapped up with the 
Protocol of Ouro Preto, which marked the creation of the Joint Parliamentary Committee 
(JPC), giving Mercosur and international juridical personality.62 During the negotiations, 
Brazil was all for the creation of the JPC, while Argentina had its doubts. The creation of the 
organ therefore was a great accomplishment for Brazil.63 
 
Since the customs union came into full effect in 1995, Mercosur has been affected by 
several challenges. One of the bigger challenges is the lack of enforcement of the institution. 
Mercosur does have a dispute settlement system, but it has been overlooked in many 
instances. The reason for this is usually said to be the reluctance of Brazil in establishing a 
system where all members are able to enforce agreements, meaning that weaker states would 
have the power to trump powerful states.64 Furthermore, negotiations on policies seem to be 
centered around a framework of Brazil’s internal economy, mostly complying with their 
needs and not the needs of the collective.65 The biggest challenge Mercosur faced were the 
devaluation crises of Brazil and Argentina in 1999 and 2001 respectively. These had a big 
impact on Mercosur because the states needed to implement unilateral trade policies to save 
their own economies. Even though all states have benefited from Mercosur, one more than the 
other, the institution still needs to be improved in order to properly respond to member states’ 
crises.66 
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Economic power asymmetries 
Before Mercosur 
 Brazil has been a strong regional 
power for quite some time now and it enjoys 
a lot more economic power than the other 
three Mercosur member states. The concept 
of economic power is measured by looking at 
the states’ national GDP and its trade-to-GDP 
ratio to determine its economic dependency. 
Figure 7 shows the GDP levels of Brazil, 
Argentina, Uruguay and Paraguay from 1965 to 1991, the year Mercosur was founded.67 It 
clearly shows the differences in the size of the economy between the four states. In 1965, 
Brazil and Argentina were around the same level but Brazil’s economy slowly started to grow 
and left Argentina behind. Even during their drop in the 1980s, Brazil’s economy was a lot 
larger than Argentina’s. Uruguay and 
Paraguay have done a lot worse when it 
comes to the economy. Although their 
position in the 1960s was not that much 
worse than that of Brazil and Argentina, 
when the latter two took off, Uruguay and 
Paraguay did not. Figure 7 does not show a 
lot of difference between Uruguay and 
Paraguay, but when zooming in, it becomes clear that their economies are quite far apart. 
Figure 8 presents the economic position of Uruguay and Paraguay and it shows that Uruguay 
had a much larger economy than Paraguay.68 
 
 Two things become clear when looking at these graphs. First, it shows a clear 
hierarchy between the four member states before Mercosur was founded. Brazil has definitely 
been on top and, especially in the last decade  before the founding of the institution, took off 
and left the other three states far behind. The second thing that becomes clear, is the weak 
position of Uruguay and Paraguay. They both perfomed a lot worse than both Brazil and 
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Argentina, but the differences between the top two and the bottom two are so immense that 
the asymmetries between Uruguay and Paraguay are barely even noticable, showing the large 
asymmetry between the top two and the bottom two. This does not mean that the difference 
between Uruguay and Paraguay is not important. Except for a short period of time in the early 
1980s, Uruguay has performed a lot better than Paraguay. 
 
Since the foundation of Mercosur 
 One of Mercosur’s goals was to promote the economic performance of every member 
state and facilitate the competitive position in the world economy.69 Figure 9 shows the 
changes in GDP between the founding of 
Mercosur in 1991 and 2015.70 While all states 
benefited from Mercosur, Brazil benefited from 
the institution more than the other three states. 
Brazil’s economy grew a lot more than that of 
the other three states. These asymmetries in 
increase of economy made sure the gap 
between Brazil and the rest got bigger, giving 
Brazil the upper hand. Figure 10 shows the 
percentages of the total GDP of Mercosur that each member state contributed in 2015.71 
Brazil is responsible for almost 75% of 
Mercosur’s GDP while Uruguay and Paraguay 
together do not even account for 4%. These data 
leave no doubt about the enormous asymmetries 
in the size of the economy between the four 
Mercosur member states. 
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Figure 11, as seen in the section 
on case selection, shows the trade-to-
GDP ratio of the four states between 1991 
and 2015.72 The graph shows that 
Paraguay’s GDP is made up by trade 
more than is the case in the other three 
states. Therefore, Paraguay is more 
economically dependent on trade and has 
the most to lose. It is followed by 
Uruguay, Argentina and lastly Brazil, 
which is the least dependent on trade. 
 
 When combining the two indicators, GDP and trade-to-GDP ratio, we can see that a 
hierarchy has formed based on economic power: first Brazil, then Argentina, then Uruguay 
and Paraguay last. 
 
Cases 
Brazil-Argentina automobile sector crisis 
 Since the state became independent from Portugal in 1822, Brazil had taken on a 
protectionist economic stance. Policies created out of this protectionism created the Brazilian 
Miracle, increasing the size of the economy significantly.73 It was not until after the state 
completed the process of democratization in 1985 that the state shed its protectionist ways, 
hopped on the train of globalization and strengthened economic ties with others.74 Brazil took 
the lead in regional integration in the Southern Cone and in the formation of Mercosur. The 
only reason for taking on leading role in the region seemed to be their own economic gains, 
working together with Argentina, Uruguay and Paraguay was supposed to boost their 
economy and place them on the world map.75 These intentions, centered around self-interest, 
become clear when looking at certain incidents and disputes in Mercosur. 
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 From 1991 to 1994, which is known as the transition period, the Mercosur member 
states negotiated all facets of the customs union they wanted to form. Rules on external tariffs 
were agreed upon in the Protocol of Ouro Preto, which was signed at the end of the transition 
period in 1994. In a few sectors, special agreements were reached. The automobile sector fell 
under one of these special agreements.76 Decision 29/94 in the Protocol of Ouro Preto 
included the automobile sector and stated that Brazil and Argentina could not implement new 
unilateral regimes within their new area of free trade and that a common regime should be in 
place no later than the year 2000.77 
 
 Just one year later, Brazil experienced some financial setbacks and tried to alleviate 
some of their troubles by limiting the automobile imports in order to promote their own 
industry. This unilateral regime did not exclude the Mercosur partners which angered the 
other member states. 78 Table 1 shows the amount of Argentina’s automobile exports and the 
amount of it that is exported to Brazil.79 Clearly, Brazil was Argentina’s most important 
partner in the trade within the automobile sector, so it is no surprise that Argentina was not 
amused with Brazil’s new regime. After Brazil made it known that they were going to restrict 
automobile imports, Argentina immediately referred to decision 29/94, stating that Brazil 
broke the agreement. Brazilian president Cardoso agreed to postpone the new regime for 
thirty days, giving the states time to work out a new agreement. Though Argentina was happy 
that Brazil wanted to talk, their happiness was short lived when Cardoso announced that, 
while they were open to talks, the new regime was not negotiable. 80 
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 Total exports 
in million US$ 
Exports to Brazil 
in million US$ 
Exports to Brazil as share 
of total exports (%) 
1990 33.6 1.8 5.3 
1991 71.7 36.6 51.0 
1992 113.3 78.7 69.4 
1993 299.9 225.2 75.1 
1994 447.8 324.2 72.4 
1995 733.9 661.2 90.0 
Table 1: Argentine automobile exports between 1990 and 1995 
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Negotiations were carried out between the presidents of the four member states, who 
all came together for a reginal summit which was followed by a bilateral summit with just the 
presidents of Brazil and Argentina.81 During the negotiations, Brazil took a hard stance in its 
refusal to exclude their Mercosur partners from the regime. Argentina kept pointing out that 
this was not acceptable, since they deliberately went against decision 29/94. But, after the 
bilateral summit, things took a drastic turn when Argentina suddenly announced that it was 
going to respect Brazil’s new regime, even though it clearly favored Brazil while Argentina 
suffered the economic costs.82 
 
 In this case, we can clearly see the go it alone power Brazil holds because of their 
economically powerful position. After the signing of the agreements during the transition 
period, Brazil felt it did not benefit from the new automobile regime. They decided to change 
the status quo, bettering themselves and hurting Argentina. Argentina had two options: go 
along or not. Brazil would not budge on their new regime, so Argentina knew that if they did 
not go alone, Brazil would simply go it alone and leave them behind, so going along would 
minimize their economic loss. 
 
Argentina-Uruguay pulp mill conflict 
In 2005, Finnish company Metsä-Botnia invested in a large pulp mill in Uruguay. This 
pulp mill, an important part of the process of turning wood into paper, was built in Fray 
Bentos, a city along the Uruguay river, which constitutes the border between Uruguay and 
Argentina.83 This occurrence 
marked Uruguay’s largest foreign 
direct investment and it was 
received with open arms in Fray 
Bentos because of all the job 
opportunities it would create.84 On 
the other side of the river, in the 
Argentine city of Gualeguaychú, 
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Figure 12: Map of the conflict region 
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people were not as pleased with the new mill. Their first concern was that the pulp mill would 
seriously pollute the river, causing undesirable ecological effects. Their other concern had to 
do with the Las Cañas beach, which can be seen in figure 12 85, a popular tourist attraction for 
both Argentines and Uruguayans, but also people from all over the world.86 The people of 
Gualeguaychú, united in a group called Asamblea Ciudadana Ambiental Gualeguaychú 
(Citizen’s Environmental Assembly of Gualeguaychú, ACAG), started their protests at the 
end of April 2005. During this time, Uruguayan citizens also supported the protests in hopes 
of saving the environment, but as time progressed, most of them started to support their 
government and protests were solely carried out by Argentine citizens.87  
 
Nestor Kirchner, president of Argentina, supported the local movement of 
Gualeguaychú and did everything he could to fight the construction of the pulp mill. He even 
went as far as to sue Uruguay in the International Court of Justice, claiming that Uruguay 
violated the Bilateral Treaty of the Uruguay River. According to that treaty, both states had to 
agree to anything concerning the river that may harm it and Argentina claimed that Uruguay 
did not hold its end of the bargain with the construction of a pulp mill that would possibly 
pollute the river.88 The International Court of Justice did not give in to Argentina’s demands, 
stating that there was no proof that the pulp mill would pollute the river. With this ruling, 
Argentina had to find another way to stop the pulp mill from being constructed. Argentina and 
Uruguay are connected by several cross-border bridges and these bridges are essential in 
transnational trade. Because of the importance of the bridges, the ACAG saw them as a means 
in their cause and they put up road blocks, closing the bridges and hindering trade.89 The 
Treaty of Asunción states that Mercosur member states are obligated to facilitate a free 
circulation of people and goods.90 With the road blocks on the cross-border bridges, trade 
between Argentina and Uruguay was made almost impossible, causing Uruguay to appeal to 
the Mercosur dispute settlement system. The ad hoc tribunal that was set up for this case 
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unanimously agreed that Argentina violated the Treaty of Asunción, but when Uruguay asked 
for measures to stop the blockades, Mercosur did nothing.91 
 
The trade-to-GDP ratio shown before makes clear that Uruguay is very dependent on 
trade. In 2005, when all of this went down, 59% of their GDP was generated by trade against 
only 41% in Argentina.92 This made the settlement of this dispute important to Uruguay, as 
they needed to be able to use the cross-border bridges for their imports and exports. Argentina 
did not have that much to lose and kept fighting until the bitter end, not willing to give in to 
the building of the pulp mill. This case, again, shows how the state with the better economy 
has the informal power to do what they want without consequences, even after being 
condemned for doing it. 
 
Paraguay’s suspension 
 After becoming independent from Spanish rule in the nineteenth century, most Latin 
American countries struggled with the formation of their own governments, which led to 
widespread authoritarianism in the region.93 The region got caught in a wave of 
democratization in the 1980s, and slowly all states left their past of military rule behind them. 
Argentina was the first of the Mercosur member states that held democratic elections in 1983. 
They were followed by Brazil and Uruguay in 1985 and Paraguay joined them in democracy 
in 1989.94 Because of the problems the region knew with military regimes, democracy was 
institutionalized in the Declaration of the Democratic Agreement and the Protocol of Ushuaia. 
According to the latter, member states must maintain a democratic system and when they fail 
in doing so, the other states have the opportunity to suspend them.95 
 
 Paraguay’s democratic landscape consists of a multiple party system with two main 
political parties: the conservative Colorado Party and the Liberal Party. The Colorado Party 
had always been dominant, until Fernando Lugo was elected as the first liberal – and more 
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importantly, non-Colorado –  president in 2008.96 Lugo had to deal with strong opposition 
from the Colorado Party and had to work with a weak coalition that was mostly interested in 
keeping the Colorado’s out. The Colorado Party tried to impeach the president on more than 
one occasion, but they did not succeed, until 2012. 
 
A group of landless peasants had claimed a piece of land in the city of Curuguaty and 
the local police attempted to evict them in June 2012. During the eviction, thing escalated, 
shots were fired and 17 people died. The Colorado Party accused Lugo of being the cause of 
the crisis and called for impeachment based on a “poor performance of duties”.97 After the 
killings, Lugo replaced the chief of national police and the interior minister. The man he 
appointed to the latter position, Rubén Candia Amarilla, was part of the Colorado Party. This 
lost him the support of his own party, making the impeachment successful and at the end of 
June, Lugo’s presidency was over.98 Even though the impeachment was carried out legally 
according to the 1992 constitution and Lugo accepted it and stepped down, both national and 
international actors claimed it to be an ‘institutional coup’ because the decision was made 
hastily and Lugo got less than 24 hours to prepare his defense.99 The other three Mercosur 
members came together after the impeachment and decided to suspend Paraguay for breaking 
the democratic agreement. Paraguay was allowed to enter again after they held new 
elections.100 
 
 During this suspension, a lot happened that was contested by the Paraguayan 
government. The most questionable was the admittance of Venezuela little more than a month 
after Paraguay was suspended. 101 The other three states knew that Paraguay did not want 
Venezuela to be part of the institution and as a reaction, Paraguay filed a claim with the 
Mercosur court. They argued that allowing Venezuela to enter violated article 20 of the 
Constitutive Treaty, which states that all requests for accession must be agreed upon 
unanimously.102 The court issued its decision without looking at the merits of the case and 
Paraguay drew the short straw. They had to wait to re-enter the institution until democratic 
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elections were held in 2013 and under the strict condition that they accepted Venezuela as a 
full member.103   
 
In this case, the three most powerful member states made a dubious decision by 
suspending the weakest link and making all kinds of decisions during the suspension they 
otherwise could not have made. The status quo was changed and Paraguay had the option of 
rejoining the institution on new terms or letting the other three states go it alone. Since 
Paraguay is so economically dependent on trade, with a trade-to-GDP ratio of  99% in 2012, it 
had to fold and rejoin the institution and it was made clear that their place was still the 
bottom. 
 
Discussion and analysis 
When looking at the relations between the Mercosur member states since the 
beginning, after they became independent, one thing has become clear: Brazil has always 
been the big brother, determining the ways and directions of economic integration. When the 
states had just become independent, Brazil had the upper hand and, together with Argentina, 
dominated Uruguay and Paraguay. When economic integration started, it was Brazil and 
Argentina who set everything up and invited Uruguay and Paraguay to join, as long as they 
complied with their ideas. Brazil had a big say in the institutional buildup of Mercosur and 
their national economy was the main framework around which policy was made. The process 
of the foundation of Mercosur shows the first signs of go it alone power, because Brazil and 
Argentina created the framework, changing the status quo in a way that Uruguay and 
Paraguay had to go along to minimize their losses.  
  
 My theoretical argument stated that each state has a certain amount of economic 
power, determined by GDP and trade-to-GDP ratio. This is largely based on economic 
dependency, because when a big part of a state’s GDP is determined by trade, it becomes very 
dependent on the relations with the states it trades with. If a state has a lot of economic power, 
it has the option to exert informal influence within international institutions. It can act outside 
of the formal rules and shape the outcome to benefit themselves. Economic power can give a 
state the opportunity to change the status quo. If this new status quo disadvantages other 
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states, they can either go along or let the powerful state go it alone. States will mostly choose 
to go along in order to minimize their loss. 
 
 The cases, summarized in table 2, discussed in this thesis seem to agree with the 
theory. In the first case, Brazil violated the formal rules of the institution by implementing a 
unilateral trade regime concerning the automobile sector. A large part of Argentina’s 
automobile exports went to Brazil and since Mercosur partners were nog excluded, Argentina 
was greatly harmed. Because Brazil had a lot of economic power, they got away with 
changing the status quo, more or less forcing Argentina to go along with their new regime in 
order to limit their losses. The second case showed the importance of economic dependency 
in international cooperation. Uruguay has been very dependent on trade, so when Argentine 
activists closed the cross-border bridges between Uruguay and Argentina, hindering 
international trade, Uruguay was in trouble. Argentina did not have a lot to lose, so the 
government did nothing to put an end the blockades the activists put up. Again, the state with 
the most economic power won. Case number three showed how the state with the least 
economic power was shut out by the other three with a controversial suspension. Brazil, 
Dispute	 Process	 Outcome	
Brazil-Argentina	
automobile	
sector	crisis	
Brazil	implemented	a	unilateral	automobile	
regime,	going	against	the	Mercosur	
agreements.	The	new	regime	disadvantaged	
Argentina	and	the	two	states	negotiated	the	
new	regime	outside	of	the	formal	dispute	
settlement	system.		
Brazil	stated	it	would	not	budge	on	its	new	
regime,	creating	a	new	status	quo	that	
disadvantaged	Argentina	because	of	its	
dependence	on	automobile	trade	with	Brazil.	
Argentina	had	the	option	to	go	along	or	not.	If	
they	would	not	go	along,	Brazil	had	the	economic	
power	to	go	it	alone.	Either	way,	Argentina	would	
lose,	but	by	going	along	with	Brazil’s	new	regime	
their	loss	would	be	less	severe.	
Argentina-
Uruguay	pulp	mill	
conflict	
In	Uruguay,	a	pulp	mill	was	built	along	the	
river	that	borders	Uruguay	and	Argentina.	The	
Argentine	people	protested	it	and	blocked	the	
cross-border	bridges	out	of	protest,	hindering	
trade	to	and	from	Uruguay.	This	went	against	
Mercosur	rules,	so	Uruguay	filed	a	complaint	
with	the	dispute	settlement	system.	
The	Mercosur	dispute	settlement	system	ruled	
that	Argentina	was	at	fault,	but	they	did	nothing	
to	stop	the	trade	blockades.	Uruguay,	being	very	
dependent	on	international	trade,	suffered	great	
disadvantage	due	to	the	blockades.	Argentina	
depends	a	lot	less	on	trade	and	fought	to	the	
bitter	end,	going	against	the	rules	without	any	
consequences.	
Paraguay’s	
suspension	
After	the	Paraguayan	president	was	
impeached,	the	state	was	suspended	from	
Mercosur.	This	was	questionable	and	during	
the	suspension,	decisions	were	made	behind	
Paraguay’s	back.	Paraguay	fought	the	
suspension	and	the	decision	that	were	made	
during	it	in	the	Mercosur	court.	
The	court	ruled	against	Paraguay,	meaning	it	
could	only	rejoin	the	institution	if	it	accepted	
everything	that	changed	during	their	suspension.	
Paraguay	therefore	had	the	option	of	rejoining	
under	conditions	that	did	not	favor	them	or	not	
rejoining,	letting	the	institution	go	it	alone,	which	
would	have	brought	them	even	more	
disadvantage	because	of	their	economic	
dependency.	 
Table 2: Overview of the cases 
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Argentina and Uruguay made some decisions during this suspension they would not have 
been able to make if Paraguay had been present. In the end, Paraguay was allowed to rejoin, 
only if they accepted the changes that had been made. In this case, the three most powerful 
states changed the status quo and Paraguay had two options, just like Argentina in the first 
case: go along or let the institution go it alone. Paraguay would lose either way, but their 
losses would be smaller if they went along so a year after their suspension, they rejoined 
Mercosur.  
 
When assessing these three cases, we can see that Brazil, the state with the most 
economic power, trumped Argentina, Argentina, as second in line, trumped Uruguay and all 
three states together trumped Paraguay, the weakest link. Economic power gives a state the 
upper hand because other states are economically dependent on it. Because of this 
dependency, weaker states cannot afford to lose their relations and have to go along with the 
new status quo created by their superiors. 
 
One of the big difficulties in this research, is that it is hard to draw any hard 
conclusions on the effect of economic power, because it is not always clear what the rationale 
of decisions was. There is a clear correlation between economic power and the outcome of 
disputes, but more extensive research should be conducted to further assess the causality of 
this mechanism. Besides that, this thesis had not paid a lot of attention to the member states’ 
domestic affairs. Looking at the internal pressures from citizens or politicians may provide us 
with more insight on the choices the states made. Another thing further research should focus 
on, is the effect of economic power on a wider level. Here, I chose to look at regional power 
but the same effects may be present on a global or transnational level. But, shortcomings put 
aside, one thing has become clear: economic power matters and it appears the utopian world 
of Walter Annenberg, where money power is irrelevant, is nothing but a fairytale. 
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